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Abstract
This paper studies vertical integration of a retailer and an operator in the e-commerce
sector. It shows rst that the comparison between independent oligopoly and integrated
monopoly involves a tradeo¤ between competition and double marginalization which
will have the opposite e¤ect. With linear demand we need at least 3 rms (upstream
and downstream) for the independent oligopoly to yield larger surplus. With constant
elasticity demand, on the other hand, this is always true.
Second it considers a setting where the number of rms is endogenous and de-
termined such that gross prots cover xed costs. While the integration of a single
retailer-delivery operator pair may initially be welfare improving, the resulting market
structure may not be sustainable. Furthermore, there exist a range of xed costs for
which the integrated monopoly emerges (following a single integration) and is welfare
inferior to the initial independent equilibrium even when the reduction in the number of
xed costs is taken into account. Within this setting it also shows that multiple integra-
tion is typically welfare superior (for a given total number of rms) to the integration
of a single retailer-delivery operator.
Third and last, it considers an extension wherein customers di¤er according to their
location, urban or rural, involving di¤erent delivery costs. It shows that urban integra-
tion is more likely to have an adverse e¤ect on welfare than full integration.
JEL classication: L81, L87, L42.
Keywords: vertical integration, parcel delivery, e-commerce.
1 Introduction
We study the implications of vertical integration in the e-commerce sector. Specically,
we consider the possibility that a (major) retailer and/or a platform buys one or several
of the parcel delivery operators, or sets up its own delivery network.
Horizontal mergers are typically considered as suspicious and potentially anti-
competitive. In the e-commerce sector, this includes the emergence of platforms which
may bring about signicant market power both in the retail and indirectly in the up-
stream parcel delivery market; see e.g., Borsenberger et al. (2016).
The economic literature on vertical mergers yields more mixed results. It gener-
ates a number of potential benets. These include the reduction of transaction costs,
technological economies, and probably most signicantly, the elimination of successive
monopolies or oligopolies and thus of the double marginalization these entail.1 However,
on the downside, it also involves the danger of foreclosure. There is an extensive liter-
ature on this concept and its scope is quite large; see for instance Rey and Tirole (2007)
or Motta (2004, Ch.6). Probably the most extreme example is when the merger deprives
the competing rms from an essential input and thus e¤ectively excludes them from the
market. But the concept also covers a wider range of anti-competitive practices made
possible by a vertical merger, including various types of vertical restraints (tying exclu-
sive territories, etc.), the extension of market power in one market segment (upstream
or downstream) to a di¤erent market segment, the possibility to raise competitors cost
etc.
In the postal sector this issue is particularly relevant. Some big retailers/platforms
already have signicant market power in their relevant markets, which gives them
monopsony power towards parcel delivery operators.
In a rst step, Sections 24, we make the assumption that a vertical merger with
a major retailer buying a delivery operator and/or setting up its own delivery network
will in the long run result in an integrated monopoly. We revisit this assumption
later and show how the integrated monopoly may come about when the number of
1See Viscusi, Vernon and Harrington (1998) or Motta (2004) for a detailed overview of the various
e¤ects of vertical integration.
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active rms is endogenous. We compare the integrated monopoly to a competitive
scenario with independent retailers and delivery operators. This comparison involves a
tradeo¤ between competition which tends to decrease prices and double marginalization
which will have the opposite e¤ect. Consequently, we cannot expect a general and
unambiguous result. We show that with linear demands the integrated monopoly sets a
higher price and achieves a lower total surplus than the independent oligopoly provided
that there are at least 3 retailers and delivery operators. With a constant elasticity of
demand on the other hand surplus is larger even for an independent duopoly. In this
rst step we evaluate welfare gross of xed costs. This implies that a larger surplus may
not be su¢ cient to yield a larger welfare.
In Section 6 we do account for xed costs and their impact on welfare and on
the number of active rms in a setting, where the number of rms is endogenous and
determined by the opportunity to earn positive prots net of xed costs. This issue is
too complex to deal with analytically and we resort to numerical illustrations.2 However,
to set the grounds for this we rst need to dene and study the equilibrium with a single
integrated rm and several independent retailers and/or delivery operators; this is done
in Section 5.
The numerical results then yield a number of interesting insights. First, while the
integration of a single retailer-delivery operator pair may initially be welfare improving,
the resulting market structure may not be sustainable when the induced decrease in the
competitors prots leads to their exit. Depending on the xed costs this may well result
in an integrated monopoly as only sustainable conguration (and as initially assumed).
This requires xed costs to be su¢ ciently large, which in turn pleads for a small number
of rms. Interestingly, it turns out that there exist a range of xed costs for which the
integrated monopoly emerges (following a single integration) and is welfare inferior to
the initial independent equilibrium even when the reduction in the number of xed costs
is taken into account.
The second interesting lesson that emerges is that multiple integration is typically
2For the cases of linear and of constant elasticity demand, analytical solutions can be obtained (and
some expressions are provided in the Appendix). However the expressions are not very telling so that
examples are useful to illustrate the cases that can arise.
2
welfare superior (for a given total number of rms) to the integration of a single retailer-
delivery operator.
The settings discussed so far neglect one crucial characteristic of the parcel delivery
sector, namely that delivery costs di¤er across customers. In Section 7 we consider an
extension in which we distinguish between two types of customers according to their
location: urban or rural. Delivery costs are larger for rural than for urban customers.
We assume that delivery operators (when independent) charge a uniform delivery rate
and retailers a uniform price. A vertically integrated rm on the other hand is likely
to deliver only in urban areas and take advantage of an independent delivery operators
uniform pricing for customers in high cost areas. We reexamine the implications of ver-
tical integration in this context, while considering the simplest possible initial situation,
namely an independent duopoly (two retailers and two delivery operators). We show
through analytical and numerical examples that urban integration is more likely to have
an adverse e¤ect on welfare than full integration. A crucial factor in the comparison
turns out to be the proportion of rural customers (which must be su¢ ciently large), but
at least for the considered demand functions the result obtains for proportions which
are consistent with stylized empirical facts.
When examining this issue we assume in a rst step that the integrated rm nds it
benecial not to deliver in rural areas. While this is intuitive it is not a priori obvious
because the operators delivery rate will include a markup above marginal cost. In
a second step, we show through some numerical examples that this is not an empty
assumption.
2 Independent retailers and delivery operators
There are (potentially) I upstream delivery operators i = 1; :::; I: Each delivers yi parcels
at a constant marginal cost ki and xed cost Fi. There are J downstream retailers
j = 1; :::; J who sell a homogenous product xj at a variable cost cj (xj) and pay a per
unit delivery rate of t. Retailers also face a xed cost Gj  0. The demand for the nal
good is represented by its demand function X(p) or equivalently, the inverse demand
function p (X) where X is the quantity and p its consumer price.
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The timing of the game is as follow:
1. Stage 1: The delivery operator i sets a quantity of parcels yi taking as given the
quantity chosen by their competitor (but anticipating the inverse input demand
function induced by the second stage equilibrium).
2. Stage 2: The retailer j sets a quantity of the nal good xj taking as given the
quantity chosen by its competitor.
3. Stage 3: Demand is realized at a price p (X).
We study the subgame perfect (Cournot-)Nash equilibrium and, as usual solve the
model by backward induction. We derive general price formula and illustrate them using
analytical and numerical examples. All of these assume that marginal cost is constant,
cj (x) = cjx; and that demand is either linear p (X) = a bX, or that demand elasticity
" dened by jX 0(p)p=X(p)j is constant.
2.1 Stage 2
Each retailer j chooses xj that solves p (X) such that:
max
xj
pxj   c (xj)  txj  Gj
s.t. p = p
0@X
j
xj
1A
The FOCs for each retailer j = 1; :::; J , are given by
p (X) + p0 (X)xj   c0j (xj)  t = 0; (1)
which implies
p (X)  c0j (xj)  t
p (X)
=  p
0 (X)xj
p (X)
(2)
This system of J simultaneous equations denes the (second stage) Nash equilibrium
quantities xj(t) and the total output
X(t) =
X
j
xj(t);
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and we can dene an inverse demand function for the upstream market as
t (X) = t
0@X
j
xj
1A : (3)
Let us illustrate this procedure through the two examples mentioned above.
2.1.1 Example 1: linear demand
In this case, equation (1) is given by
a  b
JX
k=1
xk   bxj   cj   t = 0, j = 1; :::; J:
Summing over all j yields
J (a  t)  bJX   bX  
X
k
ck = 0;
so that
X (t) =
J
J + 1
(a  t  c)
b
;
where
c =
1
J
X
k
ck;
is the average marginal cost of the retailers, excluding delivery. Inverting this function
we obtain
t (X) = a  c  J + 1
J
bX (4)
2.1.2 Example 2: constant elasticity demand
Summing (1) over j yields
Jt = Jp (X) + p0 (X)X  
JX
j=1
cj
so that
p(X)  c  t
p(X)
=
1
J"
;
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which is the classical expression, best known in the monopoly case with J = 1. This
equation holds for any demand function, but it yields a closed form solution only when
" is constant. Solving for t yields
t (X) = p (X)

1  1
J"

  c: (5)
2.2 Stage 1
Each delivery operator chooses yi to solve
max
yi
tyi   kiyi   Fi; (6)
s.t. t = t (X) , X = Y =
X
i
yi:
This is exactly like a traditional Cournot oligopoly with inverse demand t(X). Subgame
perfection requires that the level of t induces a second stage equilibrium with aggregate
output X = Y =
P
i yi. The FOC associated with delivery operator is problem is given
by
yi
@t (Y )
@yi
+ t (yi)  ki = 0; i = 1; :::; I: (7)
To obtain the equilibrium of the full game, one has to substitute t() from (3) and
solve this system of I equations. This gives us the yis from which we can obtain t and
thus also the equilibrium outputs of the retailers xj . The xed cost play no direct role
in this problem as they are a constant in the prot maximization problem. However,
the equilibrium is sustainable only if all delivery operators realize a positive prot in
equilibrium. We assume for the time being that this is the case.
To illustrate these conditions and to show how they can be used to determine the
equilibrium of the full game, we return to our two examples.
2.2.1 Example 1
Substituting (4) into (7) yields the following equations for i = 1; : : : ; I
 J + 1
J
byi + a  c  J + 1
J
bY   ki = 0
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which, after simplication can be written as
 yi   Y + J
J + 1
(a  c  ki)
b
= 0:
Summing over I, using X = Y and rearranging yields
X =
I
I + 1
J
J + 1
 
a  c  k
b
; (8)
where
k =
1
I
IX
i=1
ki
denotes the average of the delivery operators marginal delivery costs.
2.2.2 Example 2
We now substitute t() from (5) into (7) to obtain
yip
0 (Y )

1  1
J"

+ p (Y )

1  1
J"

  c  ki = 0
Summing over i, using X = Y and rearranging successively yields
Y p0 (Y )

1  1
J"

+ Ip (Y )

1  1
J"

  Ic 
X
i=1:::I
ki = 0
p (X)

1  1
J"

1  1
I"

  c  k = 0;
so that
p (X) =
c+ k 
1  1J"
  
1  1I"
 (9)
3 N integrated rms
We now suppose that there are N integrated rms denoted by subscript n = 1; :::; N . An
integrated rm maximizes total prots obtained from its up- and downstream activities.
This implies that the two stages collapse into a single stage, where rm n chooses xn
that solves
max
Xn
p (X)xn   cn (xn)  knxn   Fn  Gn
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The FOC is
p0 (X)xn + p (X)  c0n (xn)  kn = 0 (10)
We once again present the solution for the two examples
3.1 Example 1
The FOCs are then given by
a  bX   bxn   cn   kn = 0:
Summing over N and solving for X yields
X =
N
N + 1
a  c  k
b
; (11)
where
c =
NX
n=1
cn
N
k =
NX
n=1
kn
N
denote the average of retailersand delivery operatorscosts.
3.2 Example 2
Summing condition (10) over N and solving for p shows that
p (X) =
c+ k 
1  1N"
 : (12)
which, once again, represents a closed form solution when " is constant.
4 Independent vs integrated operators
We now compare the independent and integrated equilibria for our two examples. We
assume for the time being that c and k are the same under the two scenarios. To
compare total surplus we can then either compare X or p, keeping in mind that the
best solution is the one which gives the larger output and the lower price. For the time
being, we restrict our attention to surplus, which does not account for xed costs. These
will be reintroduced and included in the welfare analysis in Section 6.
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4.1 Example 1
In this setting it is easier to compare equilibrium aggregate output levels. Using (8)
and (11) shows that the equilibrium with independent operators yields a larger output
than the integrated solution if and only if
I
I + 1
J
J + 1
>
N
N + 1
:
With N = 1, this condition is violated for J = 2; I = 2, 4=9 < 1=2. Consequently
the integrated monopoly yields a better solution than two independent retailers and
delivery operators. In other words, with two rms at each level, competition is not
strong enough to compensate for the double marginalization that occurs when delivery
operators are independent. Furthermore, when J = 3 and I = 2 or J = 2 and I = 3
the two solutions are equivalent. To obtain a better solution than under the integrated
monopoly it takes at least 3 retailers and 3 delivery operators.3
4.2 Example 2
Turning to the constant demand elasticity case, we use (9) and (11) to show that an
integrated monopoly yields a higher price and is welfare inferior if and only if
1  1
N"

<

1  1
J"

1  1
I"

(13)
Suppose again that N = 1, J = 2; I = 2, so that (13) reduces to
1  1
"

<

1  1
2"

1  1
2"

4"("  1) < (2"  1)2 = 4"("  1) + 1
a condition which is always satised.4 Consequently, the competition under vertical sep-
aration dominates as long as there are at least two retailers and two delivery operators.
It thus turns out that constant elasticity demand leads to a more intense competition.
3Or 2 retailers with 4 delivery operators, etc.
4However, J = 2 and I = 1 or J = 1 and I = 1 is not enough. Condition (13) then requires
1  1
"

<

1  1
2"

1  1
"

;
which is never satised.
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Its downward pressure on the price outweighs the cost of double marginalization even
for a duopoly.
5 A single integrated rm competing with non integrated
retailers and delivery operators
So far we have assumed that the integration of one of the retailers and delivery operators
results in a monopoly. To show how this can come about we shall now consider a setting
where the number of actors is endogenous and determined as the maximum number of
retailers and delivery operators who can realize positive equilibrium prots. In other
words, their prots gross of xed costs must exceed their xed costs. The no integration
equilibrium with I independent delivery operators and J retailers has been studied in
Section 2. The equilibrium prots determine the range of xed costs for which this
equilibrium is sustainable. Alternatively one can set given levels of xed costs and
determine I and J endogenously. Either way the relevant equilibrium to consider is
that determined in Section 2.
To study the equilibrium number of delivery operators and retailers when one pair is
vertically integrated, we have to study the equilibrium with J 1 independent retailers,
I   1 independent delivery operators and one integrated retailer cum delivery operator.
To avoid tedious repetitions, we concentrate on the proper specication of the game
and the general conditions. Their counterparts for the two considered examples are
given in Appendix A. They are used to solve the numerical illustrations presented in
the next section.
5.1 Stage 2
Retailers 2; : : : ; J solve
max
xj
p(X)xj   c (xj)  txj  Gj
while the integrated retailer 1 solves
max
x1
p (X)x1   c1 (x1)  k1x1   F1  G1
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The FOCs are given by
p (X) + p0 (X)xj   cj   t = 0; j = 2; :::; J (14)
p (X) + p0 (X)x1   c1   k1 = 0 (15)
5.2 Stage 1
Delivery operators 2; : : : ; I solve
max
yi
tyi   kiyi   Fi;
s.t. t = t (X 1) , X 1 = Y 1:
The rst order condition yields:
t0 (X 1)xi + t (X 1)  ki = 0; i = 2; :::I (16)
6 Numerical examples
These numerical examples bring together the specications considered in Sections 2,
3 and 5. Most importantly we use the equilibrium prots they yield to study which
market structure is sustainable when the number of delivery operators and retailers
is endogenously determined. This shows that for suitable levels of xed costs, the
integration of a single retailer-delivery operator pair indeed results in an integrated
monopoly.
For each scenario we report only the most relevant properties of the equilibrium,
including, total output as well as prots and total surplus, both of these being dened
gross of possible xed costs. However, we do examine the role played by xed costs,
both for entry and exit and for welfare comparisons.
All scenarios considered in this section assume k = 0:05 and c = 0:1.
6.1 Examples starting with I = J = 2:
Assume that the inverse demand function is given by p (X) = X 1=", so that demand
elasticity is constant and equal to ". We start from the independent equilibrium with 2
delivery operators and 2 retailers.
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6.1.1 Scenario 1: " = 2.
With I = J = 2 the independent equilibrium (Section 2) yields a total output of 14.06
and a total surplus (TS ) of 5.39. When retailer 1 and delivery operator 1 integrate
(Section 3) total output is 18.04 and TS increases to 5.78. Thus in a rst step, inte-
gration has a positive impact on welfare. However, when G2 > 0:15 or F2 > 0:26 (if
one of the two independent actors disappears there is no room for the other actor to
exist since there is no available market for them), the integrated monopoly is the only
sustainable equilibrium where total output is 11.11 and a TS of 5. The independent
2*2 equilibrium is thus the only sustainable equilibrium and better than the integrated
monopoly if the avoided xed costs are not too large: F2 +G2 < 5:39  5 = 0:39 while
we have either G2 > 0:15 or F2 > 0:26.5
Scenario 2*2 1i, 1r, 1o 1i
Total surplus 5:39 5:78 5
Total output 14:06 18:04 11:11
Prot integrated   1:11 1:11
Prot retailer(s) 0:46 0:15  
Prot delivery operator(s) 0:35 0:26  
6.1.2 Scenario 2 " = 0:9:
We now consider a smaller level of elasticity, namely " = 0:9. This yields the following
results:
Scenario 2*2 1i, 1r, 1o
Total surplus  9:92  10:13
Total output 1:31 1:01
Prot integrated   0:65
Prot retailer(s) 0:26 0:05
Prot delivery operator(s) 0:12 0:13
In this case, integration reduces welfare even for a given number of retailers and
delivery operators. The new equilibrium may or may not be sustainable depending on
the xed costs but for this level of demand elasticity no interior solution exists for the
integrated monopoly case.
5We use the following notation to identify the scenarios. 2*2 or 3*3 etc. refers to a market with
2 or 3 independent delivery operators and retailers; 1i, 1r, 1o, for instance, means that there is one
integrated rm, one independent retailer and one independent operator. The other labels follow the
same logic and should be self-explanatory.
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6.2 Examples starting with I = J = 3
Now for each scenario, we study whether integration leads to the exit of rms (retailers
or delivery operators) for some congurations of xed costs and study whether the
equilibrium with exit leads to a lower or higher social welfare for this conguration of
xed costs. In the process we also study scenarios with multiple integrated rms.
6.2.1 Linear demand
Assume p (X) = a   bX, a = 20; b = 1 (low elasticity of demand). Starting with the
scenarios where at most one retailer-delivery operator pair integrates we obtain
Scenario 3*3 1i, 2r, 2o 1i, 1r, 2o 1i, 2r, 1o 1i, 1r, 1o 1i
Total surplus 559 575 567 569 562 547
Total output 11:16 13:23 12:13 12:40 11:57 9:92
Prot integrated   43:78 59:58 55:40 68:40 98:50
Prot retailer(s) 13:85 10:94 19:45 6:15 10:94  
Prot delivery operator(s) 18:46 10:94 7:29 24:62 16:41  
We obtain 1i (one integrated rm) as a free entry equilibrium when G2 > 10:94 and
F2 > 16:41. The 1i equilibrium implies a loss in total surplus of 559 547 = 12 compared
to the 3*3 setting but this is not enough to justify the extra xed costs incurred in the
3*3 case. In this case integration of a single retailer-delivery operator pair appears at
rst benecial. However, the following table shows that for any given total number
of rms multiple integration always welfare dominates that of a single retailer-delivery
operator pair. Specically, 3i dominates (2i, 1r, 1o) which in turn dominates (1i, 2r, 2o).
Similarly, 2i yields a higher level of welfare than (1i, 1r, 1o). This is not surprising: with
multiple integration double marginalization is eliminated while the number of competing
retailers remains constant.
Scenario 3i 2i, 1r, 1o 2i
Total surplus 584 580 575
Total output 14:88 14:06 13:23
Prot integrated 24:62 33:51 43:78
Prot retailer(s) 6:15
Prot delivery operator(s) 8:20
To test the robustness of these results we have considered a number of alternative
scenarios with di¤erent parameter values of a and b and they all give exactly the same
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pattern of results. To avoid repetitions we do not report them and instead now turn to
a di¤erent specication of demand.
6.2.2 Constant elasticity demand
Scenario 1: " = 2 Considering the same scenarios as in the linear case we obtain the
following results.
Scenario 3*3 1i, 2r, 2o 1i, 1r, 2o 1i, 2r, 1o 1i, 1r, 1o 1i
Total output 21:43 25 20:81 20:95 18:04 11:11
Total surplus 6:04 6:25 6 6:01 5:78 5
Prot integrated   0:625 0:90 0:89 1:11 1:66
Prot retailer(s) 0:257 0:156 0:31 0:07 0:159  
Prot delivery operator(s) 0:214 0:156 0:11 0:37 0:26  
Suppose we start from 3*3 and that in a rst step a single retailer-delivery operator
pair integrates. Suppose that Gj > Gmin = 0:159 and Fi > Fmin = 0:156. While this
integration yields initially a welfare gain, the resulting equilibrium is not sustainable
and with endogenous entry and exit well end up with 1i. This implies a gross social
welfare loss of 6:04   5 = 1:04. The social welfare gain stemming from decreased xed
costs is at least 2Gmin+2Fmin = 0:63. Moving from 3*3 to 1i thus involves a welfare
loss if 1:04 > 2  Gj + 2  Fi > 0:63. Notice that when 3*3 is sustainable (along with
Gj > Gmin = 0:159 and Fi > Fmin = 0:156) then the move to the integrated monopoly
involves a welfare loss even when the savings in xed costs are accounted for.
The following table shows the results obtained under multiple integration. Like in
the linear case it shows that for any given number of rms multiple integration is welfare
superior.
Scenario 3i 2i, 1r, 1o 2i
Total output 30:86 27:93 25
Total surplus 6:48 6:38 6:25
Prot integrated 0:30 0:45 0:625
Prot retailer(s) 0:077  
Prot delivery operator(s) 0:11  
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Scenario 2: " = 1:1
scenario 3*3 1i, 2r, 2o 1i, 1r, 2o 1i, 2r, 1o 1i, 1r, 1o 1i
Total output 3:72 4:23 3:27 3:07 2:42 0:63
Total surplus 10:84 10:91 10:76 10:72 10:56 9:46
Prot integrated   0:259 0:39 0:43 0:539 0:86
Prot retailer(s) 0:114 0:064 0:14 0:030 0:066  
Prot delivery operator(s) 0:079 0:064 0:05 0:167 0:122  
As in the previous case we start from 3*3 and consider integration of a single rm.
When Gj > Gmin = 0:066 and Fi = Fmin > 0:064, we end up with an integrated
monopoly 1i for which total surplus is 9:46. The gross welfare loss brought about by
integration is thus 1:38. The welfare gain due to saved xed costs is at least equal to
2  0:066 + 2  0:064 = 0:26: Integration of a single rm and the subsequent changes in
market structure thus lead to a welfare loss if the following three conditions hold: (i)
1:38 > 2  Gj + 2  Fi, (ii) Gj > Gmin = 0:066, and (iii) Fi = Fmin > 0:064. The rst
condition is necessarily satised if 3*3 is sustainable.
Considering the possibility of multiple integration yields the results shown in the
following table. The pattern of results is exactly the same as in the previous scenario.
Scenario 3i 2i, 1r, 1o 2i
Total output 5:53 4:88 4:23
Total welfare 11:03 10:98 10:91
Prot integrated 0:12 0:18 0:26
Prot retailer(s) 0:03
Prot delivery operator(s) 0:04
Comparing the two scenarios suggests that the range of xed costs for which the
integrated monopoly obtains and yields to a welfare reduction (even when the xed
cost is accounted for), is larger the smaller is the demand elasticity. This is also not a
surprise; a monopoly will have more market power, the lower is the demand elasticity.
The qualitative results obtained in these two scenarios carry over to other scenarios
with di¤erent parameter values and particularly di¤erent demand elasticities.
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7 Extension: two delivery areas
We now distinguish between two types of customers according to their location: urban or
rural. Delivery costs are larger for rural than for urban customers. Delivery operators
(when independent) charge a uniform delivery rate and retailers a uniform price. A
vertically integrated rm on the other hand delivers only in urban areas. Urban and
rural customers have identical demand functions. Let U and R = 1   U denote
the share of urban and rural customers respectively. Total demand is then given by
X (p) = UX (p) + RX (p). Rural and urban deliveries involve specic xed costs
denoted by FUi and F
R
i . Marginal delivery costs of delivery operator i, are denoted k
U
i
and kRi .
7.1 No integration
There are two retailers j = 1; 2 and two delivery operators i = 1; 2 playing the Cournot
game specied in Section 2. We proceed again by backward induction but restrict
ourselves to recalling the main results.
7.1.1 Stage 2
Retailer j chooses xj to solve
max
xj
p (X)xj   cjxj   txj  Gj
s.t. X = x1 + x2:
This is exactly the same problem as in subsection 2.1, which yields a total equilibrium
output X(t) and thus an inverse demand function t (X).
7.1.2 Stage 1
Delivery operators choose yi to solve
max
yi
tyi  
 
RkRi + 
UkUi

yi   (FUi + FRi )
s.t. t = t (X) , X = Y =
X
i
yi:
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From the results derived in Section 2, and in particular (4) and (8) derived for linear
demands we obtain
t (X) =
a  c+ 2k
3
; (17)
X =
4
 
a  c  k
9b
; (18)
where k is redened as
k =
X
i=1;2
RkRi +
 
1  R kUi
2
.
7.2 With integration
We compare this scenario with the case where retailer 1 and delivery operator 1 are
integrated. Integrated delivery operator 1 delivers only urban parcels, while delivery
operator 2 continues to be independent and delivers to both areas at a uniform rate.
Retailer 2 ships all its parcels via operator 2, while retailer 1 uses its own delivery
operator for urban parcels and delivery operator 2 for the rural ones.
7.2.1 Stage 2
Integrated retailer1 and independent retailer 2 compete. The problem of rm 1 is:
max
x1
p (X)x1   cx1   UkU1 x1   Rtx1  G1   FU1
and the problem of independent retailer 2 is:
max
x2
p (X)x2   cx2   tx2  G2
where X = x1 + x2:
The FOCs are given by
p0 (X)x1 + p (X)  c  UkU1   Rt = 0
p0 (X)x2 + p (X)  c  t = 0
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which for the case of linear demands can be rewritten as
a  2bx1   bx2   c  UkU1   Rt = 0 (19)
a  2bx2   bx1   c  t = 0 (20)
This yields the equilibrium levels of xi as function of t
x1 (t) =
a  c  2UkU1 + t
 
1  2R
3b
;
x2 (t) =
a  c+ UkU1  
 
2  R t
3b
;
and similarly for the equilibrium aggregate output
X (t) = x1 (t) + x2 (t) =
2 (a  c)  UkU1   t
 
1 + R

3b
(21)
Note that
@x2
@t
=  
 
2  R
3b
(22)
@ (x1 + x2)
@t
=  
 
1 + R

3b
(23)
Dening X 1 (t) = Rx1 (t) + x2 (t), one has
X 1 =
 
1 + R

(a  c)  UkU1
 
2R   1  2tR2   R + 1
3b
:
Solving for t and rearranging yields
t (X 1) =
 
1 + R

(a  c)  UkU1
 
2R   1  3bX 1
2
 
R2   R + 1 (24)
and
t0 (X 1) =   3b
2
 
R2   R + 1 : (25)
7.2.2 Stage 1
Delivery operator 2 is the sole player at this stage and chooses yR2 and y
U
2 to solve
max
yR2 ;y
U
2
t
 
yR2 + y
U
2
  kR2 yR2   kU2 yU2   (FU2 + FR2 ) s.t. yR2 + yU2 = X 1
t  t (X 1)
yR2 = 
R (x1 (t) + x2 (t))
yU2 = 
Ux2 (t) :
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Substituting the constraints into the objective function the problem of delivery operator
2 can thus be reformulated as
max
X 1
t (X 1)X 1 UkU2 x2 (t (X 1)) RkR2 (x1 (t (X 1)) + x2 (t (X 1)))  (FU2 +FR2 );
and the FOC is given by
t0 (X 1)

X 1   UkU2
@x2
@t
  RkR2

@x1
@t
+
@x2
@t

+ t (X 1) = 0:
With the linear demand functions we have
 
1 + R

(a  c)  UkU1
 
2R   1  3bX 1
2
 
R2   R + 1
  3b
2
 
R2   R + 1
 
X 1 + UkU2
 
2  R
3b
+ RkR2
 
1 + R

3b
!
= 0:
Solving for X 1, using expression (24) yields
tI =
 
1 + R

(a  c)  UkU1
 
2R   1+  1 + RRkR2 + UkU2  2  R
4
 
R2   R + 1 ; (26)
XI =
(a  c)

7R
2   10R + 7

+ kU2

 2 + R   R2 (2  R)

12b
 
R2   R + 1 :
+
kU1
h
R

2R
2   7R + 10

  5
i
  RkR2
 
1 + R
2
12b
 
R2   R + 1 (27)
To assess the impact of integration these expressions have to be compared to their
counterparts in the nonintegrated case, (17) and (18)
When marginal delivery costs are the same in both areas so that k = kRi = k
U
i ,
expressions (18) and (27) reduce to
XI =
(a  c  k)

7R
2   10R + 7

12b
 
R2   R + 1 ;
X =
4 (a  c  k)
9b
;
so that
sign[XI  X] = sign
h
5R
2   14R + 5

(a  c  k)
i
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and
XI < X i¤ R > 0:42:
In words, the integrated scenario yields a lower level of output and thus a larger price
and a lower welfare than the setting with independent actors as long as the share of
rural parcels is larger than 42%.
When costs di¤er and are given by kR = k + k and kU = k; the two relevant
expressions are given by
XI =
(a  c  k)

7R
2   10R + 7

  R  1 + R2k
12b
 
R2   R + 1 ;
X =
4
 
a  c  k   Rk

9b
:
And we have
sign[XI  X]
= sign
h
5R
2   14R + 5

(a  c  k) + Rk

13R
2   22R + 13
i
Since

13R
2   22R + 13

> 0, this means that the di¤erence between XI and X
increases with the cost di¤erence, so that the critical level of R above which integration
reduces welfare is increasing.
Observe that integration has two conicting e¤ects. First, under plausible conditions
it increases the competitors cost, that is t. To see this use (17) and (26) to show that
when costs are equal across delivery areas, k = kRi = k
U
i , we have
sign[tI   t] = sign
24 
h
4R
2   7R + 1
i
[a  c  k]
12
 
R2   R + 1
35
so that
tI   t > 0 i¤
h
4R
2   7R + 1
i
< 0;
a condition which is satised R > (7   p33)=8  0:15, that is when the rural area
represents more than 15% of deliveries, which we can safely assume. When costs di¤er
20
so that kR = k +k and kU = k;
tI =
 
1 + R

(a  c) + k

4R
2   5R + 3

+ R
 
1 + R

k
4
 
R2   R + 1
so that
sign[tI   t]
= sign
h
 
h
4R
2   7R + 1
i
[(a  c)  k] + Rk
h
8R
2   11R + 5
ii
:
Since
h
8R
2   11R + 5
i
> 0 then R > (7   p33)=8  0:15 remains a su¢ cient
su¢ cient condition when k > 0: To sum up, we can assume that irrespective of the
cost structure integration increases t. This in turn will have a negative e¤ect on welfare
at it will reduce the independent retailers output. This e¤ect is boosted by the impact
t has on the rural delivery cost of the integrated rm. However, integration also reduces
the urban delivery cost of the integrated rm which in turn is welfare improving. To be
more precise, integration eliminates the double marginalization on the urban segment
and this e¤ect is reinforced as kU increases (k decreases). Consequently, it is not
surprising that the welfare impact of integration depends on the share of rural parcels.
Specically when it is su¢ ciently large, one can expect the rst e¤ect to dominate.
Finally, observe that we have assumed for simplicity that marginal delivery costs
are larger in the rural area. Alternatively, one could assume that average rural costs are
larger; this may be due to smaller volumes which imply that the xed cost per parcel is
larger. From that perspective it may actually be the case that marginal rural cost are
smaller (due to excess capacities). This would not change our analysis except that k
could now be negative which would e¤ectively reinforce our conclusions.
7.3 Numerical illustrations
The following examples illustrate these results. They show cases where fullintegration
of a single rm increases welfare (given the number of rms) but where urban integration
decreases output and surplus.
Furthermore the examples allow us to compare prots of the integrated rm across
the di¤erent scenarios. So far we have assume that it is optimal for the integrated
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rm to integrate urban delivery only. While this is in line with intuition, it is not a
priori obvious because the rural delivery rate faced by the integrated rm is subject
to a markup (it is above the rms marginal cost). The examples illustrate situations
where this is indeed true: the integrated retailers prots are larger with urban-only
integration.6
7.3.1 Scenario 1: kU = 0:05; kR = 0:1; R = 0:25; c = 0:1; p (X) = X 1=", " = 2:
The example is based on the demand function with elasticity of 2 already used above.
Scenario 2*2 Integration (1i+1r+1o) Urban Integration
Total output 11:98 15:37 10:74
Uniform delivery rate t 0:113 0:116 0:156
Total surplus 4:97 5:34 4:89
Prot integrated   1:03 1:07
Prot retailer(s) 0:43 0:14 0:05
Prot delivery operator(s) 0:32 0:24 0:47
7.3.2 Scenario 2: kU = 0:05; kR = 0:1; R = 0:25; c = 0:1; p (X) = X 1=", " = 1:11:
This examples revisits the case where the demand elasticity is smaller.
Scenario 2*2 Integration (1i+1r+1o) Urban Integration
Total output 1:99 2:22 0:65
Uniform delivery rate t 0:19 0:26 0:80
Total surplus 10:39 10:47 9:48
Prot integrated   0:53 0:55
Prot retailer(s) 0:24 0:06 0:03
Prot delivery operator(s) 0:13 0:12 0:27
8 Summary and conclusion
We have studied vertical integration of a retailer and an operator in the e-commerce
sector. Our main results can be summarized as follows.
First, the comparison between independent oligopoly and integrated monopoly in-
volves a tradeo¤ between competition and double marginalization which will have the
opposite e¤ect. No general, unambiguous result can be obtained. However, we have
6These are of course just illustrations. However, try as we might, we did not manage to nd a
counter-example.
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shown that with linear demand we need at least 3 rms (upstream and downstream)
for the independent oligopoly to yield larger surplus. With constant elasticity demand,
on the other hand, this is always true.
The European market of e-commerce meets these requirements. According to Eu-
ropean Parliament (2017), three key categories of players operate in the parcel delivery
sector: the so-called global integrators, such as DHL, UPS, FedEx and TNT; pan-
European networks set up by national operators, such as DPD or GLS and national
operators who typically provide the universal service. On the retailersside also, more
than 3 retailers compete.
Second, we have considered a setting wherein the number of rms is endogenous
and determined such that gross prots cover xed costs. We have shown that while the
integration of a single retailer-delivery operator pair may initially be welfare improving,
the resulting market structure may not be sustainable. Furthermore, there exists a range
of xed costs for which the integrated monopoly emerges (following a single integration)
and is welfare inferior to the initial independent equilibrium even when the reduction in
the number of xed costs is taken into account. Within this setting we have also show
that multiple integration is typically welfare superior (for a given total number of rms)
to the integration of a single retailer-delivery operator.
Third and last, we have considered an extension incorporating an important feature
of the delivery sector, namely that customers di¤er according to their location, urban
or rural, involving di¤erent delivery costs. We have shown that urban integration is
more likely to have an adverse e¤ect on welfare than full integration. Finally, we have
provided examples where the integrated rm nds it indeed benecial not to deliver
in rural areas, even though the operatorsdelivery rate will include a markup above
marginal cost.
All these ndings echo the strategy of a major retailer who has already acquired or
partly controls delivery logistics players in several European countries. It is now also
entering into delivery logistics under its own banner with a cherry picking strategy: it
makes its own deliveries in the most attractive urban neighborhoods.
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Appendix
A First-order conditions and equilibria in Section 5 with
linear and constant elasticity demands
A.1 Linear demand
With the linear demand function (example 1) specied in Section 2, the relevant ex-
pressions for the two stages are as follows.
A.1.1 Stage 2
The FOCs are given by
a  bX   bxj   cj   t = 0, j = 2; :::; J: (A1)
a  bX   bx1   c1   k1 = 0 (A2)
From (A2), and using X = X 1 + x1, one has
x1 =
a  bX 1   c1   k1
2b
:
Moreover, summing (A1) over j = 2; :::; J yields
(J   1) a  b (J   1)X   bX 1  
JX
j=2
cj   (J   1) t = 0;
which after some computations yields:
t (X 1) =
1
2
a  b
2
X 1
(J + 1)
(J   1)  
c
(J   1) +
c1
2
(J + 1)
(J   1) +
k1
2
(A3)
With c1 = c and k1 = k this reduces to
t (X 1) =
1
2
a  b
2
X 1
(J + 1)
(J   1)  
c
2
+
k
2
A.1.2 Stage 1
Summing (16) over i = 2; :::I yields:
t0 (X 1)X 1 + (I   1) t (X 1)  k + k1 = 0 (A4)
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where t (X 1) is given by (A3) and t0 (X 1) =   (b=2) (J + 1) = (J   1) : Substituting
into (A4) and rearranging yields
X 1 =
(J   1)
(J + 1)
(I   1)
I
a
b
  2
b
(I   1)
I (J + 1)
c  2
b
(J   1)
I (J + 1)
k+
1
b
(I   1)
I
c1+
1
b
(I + 1)
I
(J   1)
(J + 1)
k1:
Since
x1 =
a  bX 1   c1   k1
2b
X = X 1 +
a  bX 1   c1   k1
2b
which can be rearranged as
X =
2IJ   J + 1
I (J + 1)
a
2b
  1
b
(I   1)
I (J + 1)
c  1
b
(J   1)
I (J + 1)
k   1
2b
1
I
c1 +
1
2b
(J   2I   1)
I (J + 1)
k1:
With c1 = c and k1 = k, this reduces to
XI =
2IJ   J + 1
I (J + 1)
a
2b
  1
b
2I + J   1
2I (J + 1)
 
c+ k

:
A.2 Constant elasticity demand
A.2.1 Stage 2
Summing (14) over j = 2:::J and adding it to (15) yields
Jp (X)

1  1
J"

  Jc  (J   1) t  k1 = 0;
p (X) + p0 (X)x1   c1   k1 = 0
Denoting X 1 = X   x1, we thus have the following system of two equations with two
unknowns X 1 and x1:
Jp (X 1 + x1)

1  1
J"

  Jc  (J   1) t  k1 = 0 (A5)
p (X 1 + x1) + p0 (X 1 + x1)x1   c1   k1 = 0 (A6)
The second equation denes x1  x1 (X 1) with
dx1
dX 1
=   p
0 + x1p00
2p0 + x1p00
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where 2p0 + x1p00 < 0 (SOC) so that
t (X 1) =
J
J   1

1  1
J"

p  J
J   1c 
1
J   1k1 (A7)
with
dt
dX 1
=
J
J   1

1  1
J"

1 +
dx1
dX 1

p0
=
J
J   1
p0
2p0 + x1p00

1  1
J"

p0
=
J
J   1
1
2 + x1p
00
p0

1  1
J"

p0 < 0 because of SOC (A8)
Note that
Xp0
p
=  1
"
so that
Xp0 +
p
"
= 0
Totally di¤erentiating this w.r.t. X yields:
Xp00
p0
=  

1 +
1
"

(A9)
Substituting (A9) into (A8) we obtain
dt
dX 1
=
J
J   1

1  1
J"

1
2  x1X
 
1 + 1"
p0 (A10)
A.2.2 Stage 1
Substituting (A7) and (A10) into (16) we obtain
J
J   1

1  1
J"

1
2  x1X
 
1 + 1"
p0xi+ J
J   1p

1  1
J"

  J
J   1c 
1
J   1k1 ki = 0, i = 2; :::I:
Summing over i = 2:::I yields
J
J   1

1  1
J"

p0 (X)
1
2  x1X
 
1 + 1"
 IX
i=2
xi +
(I   1) J
J   1

1  1
J"

p (X) (A11)
 (I   1) J
J   1 c 
I   1
J   1k1  
IX
i=2
ki = 0 (A12)
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Note that
IX
i=2
xi = X   x1:
Using (A6) this implies
IX
i=2
xi = X   c1 + k1
p0 (X)
+
p (X)
p0 (X)
;
so that (A11) can be rewritten as
J
J   1

1  1
J"

p0 (X)
1
2  x1X
 
1 + 1"
 (X   x1) + (I   1) J
J   1

1  1
J"

p (X) (A13)
 (I   1) J
J   1 c 
I   1
J   1k1  
IX
i=2
ki = 0: (A14)
Solving for p we obtain
p (X) =
c+ J 1J
I
(I 1)k   J I(I 1)J k1 
1  1J"
 
1  1(I 1)"

1 x1
X
2 x1
X (1+
1
")

which for k1 = k reduces to
pI (X) =
c+ k 
1  1J"
 
1  1(I 1)"

1 x1
X
2 x1
X (1+
1
")
 :
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